Distribution locational marginal pricing can adversely affect users in a grid-constrained transactive distribution system market that are at larger distances from the substation, thereby requiring longer paths to connect to it. When the grid operates closer to its physical limits in terms of line capacities and voltage deviations, these users are more likely to cause grid violations than others in the vicinity of the substation. Conversely, increased energy consumption by users near the substation can choke off supply to those at the grid's extremities. This research describes a novel mechanism to charge users in a more equitable manner, by regularizing the distribution system operator's (DSO) social welfare objective function with the Jain's index of fairness. The overall problem entails the maximization of the regularized objective within a set of linear constraints that ensure that the grid's physical limits are not violated. Dual decomposition is applied to the constrained optimization problem. The dual variables and unit costs are incrementally updated by the DSO using the augmented Lagrangian method. Simulation results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
Lagrange function J(·) Jain's index of fairness η Increment factor per iteration C Regularization weight In this list, only the main symbols used throughout the paper are shown. Other symbols are abstract combinations of these symbols or explained in the text. Bold lowercase and bold, italic uppercase symbols represent vectors while bold uppercase symbols represent matrices.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE RAPID proliferation of distributed energy resources (DERs) in the energy grid necessitates the need for the design of efficient transactive distribution system markets (DSMs) . Pricing mechanisms that are compatible with the physical structure of the distribution grid and take operation limits into account, are being proposed in [1] - [6] . Distribution locational marginal pricing (DLMP) as an effective means to establish the price of electricity in transactive DSMs has received significant research attention [2] - [6] .
The latest research on DLMP-based pricing decompose locational prices to its energy, losses, voltage violation, and congestion components, [4] , [5] . An inherent drawback of this method is the spatial variations in the resulting DLMP. When the grid is under stress (e.g., due to a line congestion or a node voltage hitting its operation limit), the DLMP-based pricing intrinsically charges distant nodes at higher rates than those closer to the substation. In particular, the effect of location in DLMP is substantially high if an extreme node violates the voltage constraint due to higher voltage drop.
In this paper, we propose a novel method that addresses the issue of fairness in DLMP-based DSM. We propose a fairness-regularized mechanism that can be implemented by the distribution system operator (DSO). An iterative gradient descent algorithm based on dual decomposition maximizes the global social welfare of the grid, but with spatially driven discrepancies in how the prosumers within the aggregators are charged. Incorporating fairness into the algorithm's objective has a demonstrably equitable effect on the unit energy costs.
A. Related Work
DLMP-based pricing methods and its DSM models either use DCOPF or a variant of AC optimal power flow (ACOPF) to set grid and operation limit constraints. A few papers on DCOPF-based DLMP formulations have appeared [2] , [7] , and [8] , [9] . References [2] and [7] , propose DLMP-based methods through quadratic programming and chance-constrained mixed integer programming that use DCOPF to define line congestion and alleviate it through dynamic tariffs. The work in [8] proposes two benchmark pricing methodologies, namely DLMP and iterative DLMP (iDLMP), for a congestion free energy management by buildings providing flexible demand. Aggregators are assumed to have contracts with flexible buildings to decide their reserve and energy schedules by interacting with the DSO in a cost optimal manner to avoid congestion in the distribution grid. An augmented version of DCOPF to include losses in a DLMPbased pricing mechanism with hedging rights for flexible load in distribution grid has been used in [9] . Unfortunately, due to lower x/r ratio in the distribution system, DCOPF-based DLMP has been shown to introduce significant errors [3] . Moreover, these techniques lack certain key features such as losses, voltage deviations, and reactive power flows essential in transactive DSM.
ACOPF-based DLMP formulations to determine one or more of its constituents such as energy, loss, voltage violation, and congestion prices are investigated in [3] - [5] . In [3] , a novel linearized power flow (LPF) method is proposed. In this paper, the real and reactive energy and the loss components of the DLMP are derived. In [4] , a DSM model with DLMP clearing has been proposed to manage congestion and provide voltage support. The paper uses a mixed-integer second-order-cone programming to model ACOPF and determines binary variables such as feeder configuration status and tap locations of shunt capacitors and transformers. Similarly, in [5] , the authors use a trust-region based solution methodology to obtain DLMP and its constituents through a first-order approximation of the AC power flow manifold model.
The issue of fairness in pricing has not received due attention in the above research. Fairness considerations in other forms of pricing have begun to be addressed recently. Several papers, [10] - [13] make use of the Shapley value, a concept borrowed from coalitional game theory, to accomplish fairness. In [10] prosumers' fair hourly billings is achieved depending on how the DR meet system objectives. The price of anarchy, which is the deviation of the Nash equilibrium operating point from the optimal has been used to incorporate fairness in hourly billings to prosumers in [14] , and as a basis for comparing two models of demand side management in terms of fairness in [15] . A method to determine fair energy costs to consumers based on their contribution to minimize overall system costs is proposed in [11] . Several fairness criteria based on emission minimization, minimize peak-to-average ratio, etc. have been proposed in [16] . In [12] , a pricing during direct trade among prosumers energy is proposed using the Shapley value. A fairness-based criterion is proposed in [13] to share the cost savings in a coalition of prosumers equipped with renewable energy sources and energy storage systems.
The aim of these approaches is to reward users that consume energy during more desirable time intervals and conversely, to penalize those that demand energy during undesirable periods. We term this aspect of fairness as temporal fairness. The expectation of temporal fairness is typically to redirect the grid's operation towards more feasible operating regions. There is another aspect of fairness in addition to temporal fairness that is described below.
Energy consumption by a group of users in one area of the grid affects how the other users in the grid are priced. For instance, when consumers in a node that is positioned close to the substation transformer draw a disproportionately large amount of energy, the amounts that those further downstream can obtain from the grid is stymied. It is this relative advantage or drawback of the end users, which is based on their locations that this research proposes to mitigate. It does so by incorporating another form of fairness, which we term as spatial fairness.
A few studies use other mechanisms that consider the loads' locations to fairly redistribute prices [9] , [17] . In [9] , the authors use hedging rights, a concept borrowed from the wholesale market, to mitigate the undesirable effects of physical-grid-based DLMPs to the aggregators that provide load flexibility service and achieve fairer price redistribution. Day-ahead DLMPs are computed based on an augmented version of DCOPF. Monthly contracted hedging rights are then used to hedge the risk of surcharges arising from the DLMP's congestion/loss components to the aggregators. In [17] , the authors use an indirect mechanism based on load location and their marginal contribution to the losses and voltage deviation to attain fair billing. Although these mechanisms mitigate the inherent spatial unfairness in DLMP pricing, they achieve fairer pricing indirectly by means of a secondary corrective step.
Additionally, most of the studies require some sort of offthe-shelf solver to compute DLMP and the shadow prices of the constraints in their optimization models [3] , [5] .
B. Technical Contributions
The key features of the approach proposed in this paper are summarized below.
(i) The proposed DLMP pricing mechanism addresses spatial fairness. This is accomplished by incorporating a regularization term in the system level objective function (addressed below). The Jain's index of fairness has been used for this purpose. Jain's index is an instance of a general class of fairness criteria that possess desirable features [18] , [19] that render them particularly well-suited for user-centric resource allocation applications [20] . Furthermore, unlike its use as an evaluative tool [21] or as a system constraint [22] , the proposed approach successfully includes Jain's index directly within the optimization algorithm, as well as in the DLMP pricing. (ii) The proposed framework accommodates physical constraints of the grid. It uses a linearized power flow method. Similar approaches have been used elsewhere [1] , [5] , [23] , [24] . Linearizing the power flow in this research, which is directly based on [3] , not only helps in simplifying the underlying computations, but also allows the components of the DLMP to be readily available. (iii) Prosumers in this framework are not required to reveal private information despite having their own DGs and individual utility functions. The only information exchange taking place between individual prosumers and the rest of the grid is limited to placing power demand bids in response to unit energy costs, i.e., DLMPS. (iv) If the regularization term is neglected, the proposed method maximizes the social welfare of all prosumers in the grid, i.e., the sum of all their utilities. It should be noted that this task is accomplished at the DSO level despite its lack of access to the nonlinear utility functions of individual prosumers. The proof that the maximum social welfare is attained appears in a preliminary version of one aspect of this research [25] , which neither considers Jain's index or any other fairness measure, nor addresses the constrained optimization algorithm used here. (v) The proposed approach is a bi-level mechanism, with the DSO and the prosumers aiming to maximize different objectives. Prosumers are modeled as selfish agents that aim to maximize their individual payoffs, i.e., the difference between their utilities from consuming energy and the cost of procuring it from the grid (with negative demands indicating supply). Aggregators act as the interface between prosumers and the grid. (vi) The underlying optimization is based on dual decomposition. It uses the augmented Lagrangian method [26] at the DSO level for social welfare maximization, obviating the need for off-the-shelf solvers. The rest of this paper is organized in the following manner. Section II provides details of the components of the framework adopted in this research, as well as the information flowing between them. A rigorous treatment of the DSO mechanism is postponed until Section III next, which provides mathematical details of the linearized power flow equations, the Jain's fairness index as used here, followed by the overall formulation of the optimization problem. Section IV describes the results obtained from simulation experiments. Finally, Section V concludes this study.
II. FRAMEWORK
The overall schematic of the bi-level mechanism is depicted in Fig. 1 . At the upper level is the DSO which acts as the intermediary between the grid and the wholesale market. The DSO possesses physical information pertaining to the distribution grid and exchanges unit cost and power demand signals from each aggregator, k ∈ A. Aggregators are located at some nodes of the grid, which follows a tree structured layout. Only a subset A of N contain aggregators. Each aggregator k contains a set G k of prosumers within a physical neighborhood. The information flow between an aggregator and its prosumers again pertain to unit costs and demands.
A. Prosumer Agent
In a transactive DSM, contemporary retail customers are key stakeholders -prosumer agents in this framework. Each prosumer i ∈ G k incorporates a utility function that may be construed as a measure of the satisfaction it derives from using a certain amount of energy. The utility u i k : R + → R + of prosumer i is a strictly concave and increasing function that is continuous and differentiable. Prosumer utilities have been modeled as logarithmic functions in the following manner,
This form, which has been used elsewhere ( [1] , [11] , [22] - [24] ) is shown in the schematic in Fig. 2 . The quantities a i k and b i k are prosumer specific constants, while x is its load. The quantity a i k is chosen to convert the utility into monetary units, while b i k governs the utility function's rate of saturation. It must be emphasized that the analytical treatment throughout this paper can handle any other utility function with the above characteristics.
Prosumers in this framework may be equipped with their own PV panels, thus capable of generating an amount of energy g i k so that its net power demand is the difference between x and generation, g i k as,
The sign of p i k indicates whether the prosumer receives or supplies energy to the grid. When p i k > 0, the prosumer's consumption is more than its generation (x > g i k ); consequently, it must receive the additional energy from the grid. Conversely, when p i k < 0 the prosumer supplies the surplus energy to the latter. All parameters associated with each prosumer (a i k , b i k , g i k ) as well as the choice of utility functions remain hidden from the rest of the grid.
As selfish agents, prosumers try to maximize their payoffs, which is the difference between the utility obtained from energy use and the cost of procurement. With c k being the unit cost provided to the agent, its strategy can be formulated as the following constrained optimization problem,
Differentiating the payoff π i k in (3a) with respect to p i k , with u i k being as in (1) and using the constraint in (3b) and the load x in (2), it can be shown that the demand is,
B. Aggregator
The aggregators in A are intermediary entities between their prosumers and the DSO, their role being primarily communicative. Each aggregator k receives a unit cost signal from the latter, that it sends to the agents in G k . The prosumers' response is the corresponding demand p i k as obtained from (3a), or with logarithmic utilities, from (4). The social welfare at each aggregator is the sum of the utilities of all its prosumers, and given by,
In the above expression,
This shows that the aggregator k responds to the DSO's unit cost c k with an aggregate energy demand p k = 1 T G k p k (G k = |G k |) such that the slope of W k is c k . This information from all aggregators allows the DSO to construct the gradient ∇ p [W k (p k )] k∈A required for its optimization algorithm (for further details, one is referred to [25] ).
C. DSO
The DSO's role is in realizing the underlying optimization algorithm. It receives power demand as the vector p = [p k ] k∈A 
III. MATHEMATICAL MODEL

A. Linearized AC Power Flow
The schematic in Fig. 3 shows a segment of the radial distribution network. Each node is labeled with an index k ∈ N .
Line indices are identical to those of the nodes at their receiving ends. With p k and q k being the active and reactive power injected at any node k, the active and reactive power flowing through the line k are given by the following expressions,
Here, D(k) is the set of all nodes that are downstream of node k. The quantities L P k and L Q k are the active and reactive line losses, that are computed as follows,
In (8a), V k is the voltage at node k while r k and x k are the corresponding line resistance and reactance. Letting P = [P k ] k∈A and Q = [Q k ] k∈A , it follows from (7a) that,
In the above, the vector p = [p k ] k∈A may be regarded as an |N | × 1 vector with zeros occupying every place k where
The real and reactive powers at the sending end of line k are given by the following expressions,
In (10a), δ k is the voltage angle at node k and u(k) is the index of the node that is immediately upstream of it. The expressions in (10a) are linearized to simplify the grid constraints (see later). We adopt the linearized power flow model proposed in [3] . Assuming that |V u(k) |, |V k | ≈ 1p.u., δ u(k) − δ k ≈ 0, the above equalities are approximated to yield,
Here,
The expressions in (11a) can be represented more concisely in the following manner. With V and δ representing the N × 1 vectors of all node voltages and angles, it can be shown that,
In (12),
The N × N matrix D, called the downstream matrix is given by,
The substation bus is indexed 0 / ∈ N . Its voltage V 0 and angle δ 0 are treated as constant quantities. Node voltages in terms of the nodes' real and reactive power injections, can be obtained from (9a) and (12) .
In (16), e is a vector with a 1 appearing as its first entry and all others being zeroes. The matrix C is obtained according to,
By applying Taylor's series expansion around the reference points, p 0 , q 0 , L P 0 , and L Q 0 , linear expressions for the losses can be obtained from (2) as shown below,
The matrices J L P and J L Q in (18a) are Jacobians of the losses in (8a),
B. Jain's Fairness Index
The Jain's fairness index is defined as the squared inner product of the unit vectorsx and1, wherex is along the direction of x and1 has identical elements. The following is an expression for the Jain's index,
In (19), x = [x i ] i=1:n each x i is an amount of resource allocated to any user i in a set of n users. It lies in the interval [0, 1] with values closer to unity indicating more fairness. Further details of Jain's index are discussed in Appendix-A. Jain's index can be applied to the present context in a variety of ways. The simplest manner to implement fairness would be to replace each x i above, with an aggregator power p k . In this manner, the fairest allocation would be when all aggregators receive an equal amount of power. Unfortunately, this over-simplistic version of fairness does not account for the difference in the numbers of prosumers in each aggregator. However, one important insight can be gained from this observation. Supplying resources to m out of the n users (m < n) and allocating x i = 0 to the remaining n − m would still lead to maximum of the index when the m users receive the same amount. Hence, disregarding the aggregators that supply energy does not affect optimal fairness among the remaining users.
In this research, Jain's fairness is determined as,
In the above expression and everywhere else, the operator · unless subscripted, is the L 2 norm. The quantity z is a logical vector of 0s and 1s and is given by,
Hence, z 1 is the number of aggregators that receive energy from the grid. Those that supply energy (p k < 0) are set aside from fairness considerations. Although all aggregators could readily be used, precluding sellers demonstrates the flexibility of the proposed framework. In addition, as suggested in [22] , in aggregators that sell energy, prosumers may collectively place bids to maximize their payoffs, applying their own fairness criteria. Moreover, the analytical treatment of Jain's index in Appendix-A has been restricted to the case when the argument in J(·) is confined to the non-negative orthant. Replacing z with 1 would allow aggregators that supply energy to also be included in determining fairness. In (21) , the vector n is obtained as the following Hadamard product,
In the absence of any information regarding the size or electricity needs of the household associated with each prosumer, it is assumed that all prosumers have identical demands. The quantity G k = |G k | is present in the denominator in order to allocate power to the aggregators that are roughly in proportion to their numbers of prosumers. Devising n can be refined further to include other information, such as household sizes, monetary values of the homes, historical consumption averages, etc., none of which have been considered. The formulation provided in (21) and (22) applies proportional fairness to the remaining aggregators. Proportional fairness, a game theoretic concept where agents in an aggregator choose to pay more for energy are allocated greater amounts of power. Proportional fairness, whose effectiveness has been shown in [26] , is imposed because in (22) the vector n contains the vector of unit costs c in its denominator. Proportional fairness is achieved through the use of n • p as the argument to J(·), which normalizes the energy demands of the aggregators with respect to their unit costs.
C. DSO Mechanism
The objective of the DSO is two-fold. It primarily attempts to maximize the social welfare 1 T A [W k (p k )] k∈A of all prosumers present in the grid. Next, it tries to price the agents as fairly as possible. Hence, the DSO's objective consists of a social welfare term, and an optional regularization term which is the Jain's index in (20) , weighted appropriately. Accordingly, the DSO mechanism's objective can be formulated as the following constrained optimization problem,
The linear equality and inequality constraints (23b) -(23f ) are obtained directly from the linearization described earlier in Section III-A, with appropriate rearrangements that are shown in Appendix-C. As this research used real power to determine unit costs, they have been expressed compactly in terms of the real power, which is the primal variable, p = [p k ] k∈A . The inequalities in (23b) and (23c) restrict the node voltage deviations to lie within V 0 ± ∈, where V 0 is the substation voltage. Likewise, real and reactive line flow limits are imposed by means of (23d). The equality appearing in (23e) is the power balance constraint that ensures that P 0 , the total power supplied to the DSO by the wholesale market equals the sum of the total power demands of the grid's prosumers and the power losses. Lastly, (23f ) is the weak budget balance constraint that restricts the feasible region to one where the DSO's payment at a unit cost of c 0 does not exceed the total monetary amount that it receives from the aggregators. With α,ᾱ, β, λ, γ being dual variables, and η (with appropriate subscripts), increment factors, the augmented Lagrange function corresponding to (23a) is given by,
Equating its derivative ∇ p L(p, λ, ξ , γ ) to zero, and using (6), an incremental update rule for the unit cost is obtained,
In the above expression, ∇ p J is the derivative of Jain's index in (20) , with its argument n • p restricted to the non-negative orthant. It is given by the expression given below,
Appendix-A shows the derivation of (26) from (19) . The unit cost c is initialized at the beginning of the optimization algorithm. Using (25) this cost is updated. Upon termination, the DLMP components can be readily obtained as the terms in the update rule for c new in (25) . These are the voltage component, c V , the congestion component, c C , as well as the energy and loss component c E+L . Additionally, regularization introduces a new fairness component, c F . These are as follows,
The unit cost, c new is therefore the sum of its components,
The budget balance terms (−γ c − ηc(−c T p + c 0 P 0 ) + ) are not included in (28) because, in the simulations described in the next section, as expected the constraint was inactive upon convergence, leaving behind a small monetary surplus with the DSO.
In each iteration of the optimization algorithm, the dual variables are updated using dual gradient descent as follows,
The increment factors η V , η S , η P and η above are adjusted in each iteration. The algorithm terminates only when the updates to p are such that p 1 1 for several consecutive iterations. The following proposition argues that termination occurs when the global maximum of (p) is reached.
Conjecture: The objective (p) has a unique global maximum.
Rationale: It can be shown that when p is restricted to the non-negative orthant, ∇ 2 J(p) 0. Whence J(·) is a concave function. Under our assumption, the utility functions u i k (·) are strictly concave and increasing (see Fig. (2) ), so is their sum W k at each aggregator, as well as the social welfare term in (23a). It follows that (p) has a unique maximum.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The model used here was implemented on a modified IEEE 37-bus system as shown in Fig. 4 . There were 17 nodes with aggregators (shaded circles in Fig. 4 ). For clarity, the aggregators were indexed separately as A1 − A17. Three separate scenarios were created for this study. In Scenario-I all aggregators had G k = 10 prosumers, without generation, but with a i k , b i k , generated randomly in each case. Scenario-II was similar to Scenario-I, except that the number of prosumers was doubled in aggregators A3, A9, A11, A17 (G k = 20, k = 12, 25, 27, 36) . In Scenario-III prosumers in aggregators A8, A10, A14 (k = 23, 26, 31) were equipped with PV generation. Their generations, g i k were obtained randomly. All simulations were performed using MATLAB. The increment factors were obtained in each iteration as η = c new −2 η 0 with a separate η 0 for each factor η in the range 0.1 -0.01. The mechanism was investigated for each scenario, both without and with fairness regularization (C = 0, C = 0.4 in (23a)). Fig. 5 (top) shows simulation results obtained from Scenarios-I, II, and III. The vertical bars are the power allocations of the aggregators that were obtained from the simulations. Those without fairness regularization appear in blue, (p k ) while those with regularization are in yellow (p * k ). The unit costs of the aggregators without fairness (c k ) and with fairness (c * k ) are also provided in solid and dotted lines. From Fig. 4 it can be seen that aggregators A1, A9, A10 are positioned close to the substation bus. Consequently, when not regularized for fairness the mechanism outputs costs where these aggregators are sold energy at lower rates and therefore enjoy higher power allocations. In contrast, A5, A6, A15, A16, A17 experience higher unit costs and lower power allocations. Fig. 5 shows how regularization helps in mitigating this adverse effect. Fairness causes aggregators to be charged in a more equitable manner.
The breakdown of the unit costs into its DLMP components is also shown in Fig. 5 (bottom) . These are shown as stacked bars colored purple for the fairness component (c F ), light blue for the unit cost due to energy usage and loss (c E+L ), green for unit costs of congestion (c C ), and yellow when the voltage limit constraints (c V ) are active.
The DLMP components in Fig. 5 sheds further insights into the differences in the unit costs. It is seen that the voltage components are very low for the three aggregators A1, A9, A10 located close to the substation. This is because voltage constraints are active further downstream in the grid, causing an increase in the voltage cost components in those aggregators (A5, A6, A15, A16, A17). These are the aggregators that are furthest from the substation (Fig. 4) . The mitigating effect of regularizing the DSO's objective is evident from the DLMP components in Fig. 5 . The algorithm provides cost discounts to the spatially disadvantaged aggregators, which is compensated by incrementing the unit costs of three aggregators in the substation's neighborhood. Fig. 6 shows results of Scenario-II with twice the agents present in aggregators A3, A9, A11, A17 as elsewhere, allowing one to examine the effects of congestion. The rationale behind this choice of aggregators is due to the wide range of their locations vis-à-vis the substation, with A9, A11 being closest to it, A3 further away and A17 located at a large distance.
A similar pattern as before is observed in Fig. 6 , with distances having a severe impact on the unit costs. Increased loads in some aggregators cause congestion. Consequently, in the absence of regularization, aggregators yield higher unit costs for aggregators A4, A5, A6, A15, A16, A17 due to their distance than the others, as well as in comparison to what they were charged in Scenario-I.
The DLMP components elucidate the effect of higher congestion. Aggregators A4, A5, A6, A15, A16, A17 are priced at higher levels (c C ). The significantly lower unit cost of A1 and to a lesser extent, A9, A10 due to their closeness to the substation, is evident. Supplementing the DSO's objective with Jain's index helps alleviate the pricing disparity. The previously advantaged aggregators see the highest unit costs due to the fairness component (c F ). Conversely, those furthest away are able to increase their demands due to the lowered costs.
The effects of the penetration of PV generation in aggregators A8, A10, A14 diminishes the undesirable influence of congestion in voltage deviations throughout the distribution grid. Due to their PV generations, and resultant lower demands, the fairness component rewards them with highest drop in unit costs. This is seen in Fig. 7 . Other aggregators also benefit from the introduction of PV generation in the grid in comparison the unit costs without fairness shown in Fig. 7 . The congestion costs (c C ) are uniformly lower than in the previous case. The DLMP components of the unit costs in this figure shows how regularization tries to rectify locational discrepancies.
Lastly, the tradeoff between welfare and fairness, which is very well quantified in econometric and game-theory literature, is briefly addressed. Scenario-II was simulated when the regularization weight C was varied between C = 0 and C = 0.5 in increments of 0.02. The results are shown in Fig. 8 clearly illustrating the tradeoff. Increasing fairness J(n • p) is associated with a simultaneous decrease in the social welfare,
k∈A , as seen in Fig. 8 (left) . Fig. 8 (right) shows the same phenomenon in terms of the price of fairness -the fraction reduction in efficiency. The term efficiency here refers to the ratio of the social welfare with regularization to that of its maximum attainable value sans regularization. The price of fairness is given by,
The presence of a 'knee' region in the trade-off curves in Fig. 8 can be observed. Values of C beyond this region cause a sharp drop in welfare, but with relatively smaller increments in fairness. Fortunately, even in the extreme case (C = 0.5), the price of fairness is approximately equal to 0.04, which translates to a somewhat tolerable 4% reduction in the outcome's efficiency.
V. CONCLUSION
This research entails innovations along several directions. It is privacy preserving, in that it attains the global maximum of (p) in (23a), without any knowledge about the prosumers' parameters. This is because the bidding process taking place between the prosumers and the aggregators allows the gradient ∇ p (p) to be computed. The use of dual decomposition helps in dissociating the various DLMP components of the unit costs.
The application of Jain's fairness index in a distribution system and derivation of its component for DLMP is, to the best of the authors' knowledge, novel. It was shown to apportion energy to the aggregators in a more equitable manner. In addition, again to the best of the authors' knowledge, the use of Jain's index within the gradient descent algorithm is novel.
There are a few limitations of the research described here. The algorithm's rate of convergence was not investigated properly. When the initialization was entirely arbitrarily, the gradient descent would start at an infeasible region that was very far away from the active feasible manifold. However, the algorithm consistently reached the optimum in ∼10 2 steps which is acceptable.
In extending the proposed approach to multiple (say, T > 1) time slots, each agent would receive a T × 1 vector of costs c k from the aggregator, and similarly respond with a vector of demands p i k . Since this extended approach would require computing optimal schedules of energy storage elements and shiftable loads (e.g., PHEV, washer/dryer unit, etc.), the agent's scalar constrained optimization in (3a) whose optimum can be obtained in a straightforward manner as shown in (4) , would have to be replaced with a mixed integer convex programming algorithm. Although the DSO problem would still be formulated in the manner shown in (23a), the dimensionality of the primal variable p would increase T-fold. The resulting increase in computational overheads needs to be investigated. The authors believe that using the primal and dual variables of earlier time slots instead of arbitrarily initializing the algorithm each time, would achieve several fold speedups. Jain's index would also be required to quantify fairness over T time slots. One plausible approach would be to treat the composite Jain's index as one that is divided into T non-overlapping time partitions. The partition-irrelevancy of Jain's index can then be readily invoked (see Appendix A for details). Jain's index has been studied extensively for fairness in allocating multiple resources (see [27] ). Hence, another approach would be to treat energy during each time slot as a distinct resource. Further studies would reveal the most suitable method.
Linearization was used for mathematical convenience, computational simplicity, and as linear constraints guarantee unique maxima. The approximation error in the output must be quantified for a more thorough assessment of the approach's performance, and theoretical upper bounds established. However, it may be noted that the outputs of some simulations were compared with actual power flow. The largest errors were in the line voltages, which was acceptable at the order of 10 −3 .
A more rigorous investigation into Jain's index needs to be carried out. In particular, the choice of the parameter C in (23a) has not been examined here; the range used in the simulations being rather arbitrary. A value of C must be picked with utmost care to avoid the 'knee' threshold ( Fig. 8) , beyond which efficiency drops steeply. The results discussed in the previous section are ad hoc, offering no insights into what appropriate choices of C might look like in other energy grids. The sole recommendation here is that it be scaled in proportion to the dimensionality of the argument to Jain's index. Fortunately, the theoretical treatment of the tradeoff between welfare and fairness in [16] may offer invaluable insights for our purpose. It derives an expression for the maximum weight that can be assigned to fairness vis-à-vis welfare, beyond which the Pareto-optimality of the efficiency-fairness tradeoff can no longer be guaranteed. In other words, for an energy demand p that our approach yields with a large C, there might exist another demand p that is both fairer as well as more efficient than p! It remains unclear whether the cessation of Pareto-optimality in [16] bears any relationship to the 'knee' here.
Finally, Jain's index should be examined within the context of a generalized class of functions to quantify fairness (referred to as α-fairness) as detailed in [18] and [19] .
APPENDIX A JAIN'S INDEX
The notation used here is described first. The quantity 1 n is a vector with all unit elements. The optional subscript n is its dimensionality. Given two n dimensional vectors x and y, let x † d and y † d be the d dimensional vectors formed by separately taking the numerically smallest d elements of x and y. We say that x majorizes y if and only if 1 T n x = 1 T n y and
This relationship is denoted as x y. Majorization can be interpreted in the following manner. Consider a pair of resource demand vectors, x and y, available to n aggregators, such that their sums are equal (1 T n x = 1 T n y). The quantities 1 T d x † d and 1 T d y † d are the sums of the resources allocated to the d aggregators that receive the least amount of resource. Under these circumstances,
holds when these resource-deprived aggregators collectively receive more resource through demand x than through demand y. Hence, intuitively x y means that x is fairer than y as resourcedeprived aggregators in x are allocated a larger share of the total resource. Given a vector x ∈ R n of allocated demands, the corresponding Jain's index of fairness, J(x) ∈ [0, 1], is given by,
A few features of Jain's index that are relevant to the present context of energy distribution systems are listed below (with explanations provided only when the corresponding feature is not self-explanatory).
(i) Jain's index is Schur concave, i.e.,
x y ⇒ J(x) > J(y).
(ii) Jain's index is permutation and scale invariant, i.e.,
Here P is any permutation matrix and t > 0, a scalar.
(iii) Equal allocation has the highest possible fairness of unity,
(iv) Idle aggregators have no effect on the scaled Jain's index,
where m and n are the dimensions of 0 and x. Here, the Jain's index may be construed as the average fairness per agent, and the scaled index, the total fairness.
(v) Incrementing the resource demand of a resourcedeprived aggregator by a small amount increases Jain's index. Conversely, incrementing that of a high resource-fed aggregator decreases the index. If x is obtained from vector x by incrementing x i by a small amount 0 < δ 1 while maintaining all other elements constant, then we have,
The quantityx is the harmonic mean of the elements in x,
(vi) Uniform 'taxation' is unfair. In other words, if t > 0 is a small scalar then,
(vii) Jain's index is partition-irrelevant, i.e., J(x ⊕ y) = J(x) · J(y).
The above feature allows Jain's index to be computed in an efficient manner. For example, when dividing a resource into two parts x = [x 1 x 2 ] T and then further subdividing the divided resources as [y 1 y 2 ] T , the Jain's index of the entire division can be obtained directly from the product of the indices of the smaller demands x and y. It may be noted that the above expression is only a simplified case of the actual partition-irrelevancy property of Jain's index. Partitionirrelevancy allows Jain's index to be computed in a recursive manner.
The Schur concavity of Jain's index in (i) is perhaps the main motivation for its adoption as an indicator of fairness. The fairer its argument x is, the higher the corresponding index becomes. Features (ii) -(iv) are evident from the expression for J(·). For the interested reader, proofs of the index's Schur concavity as well as its remaining features (v) -(vii) can be obtained from [18] . The widespread use of Jain's index for a wide variety of networked resource allocation applications can be inferred from the direct relevance of all these features in such tasks.
Jain's index is a special case of a family of fairness indices (that includes Shannon and Rényi entropies) that are referred to as α-fair indices. They share a remarkable set of features that make them particularly well suited in ensuring fairness when allocating resources. The interested reader is again referred to [18] for an elaborate mathematical treatment of the α-fair family of indices.
In addition to the earlier well-established properties of Jain's index, we establish its concavity next. Throughout the remainder of this section, we restrict our attention to the non-negative (first) orthant, R n + as the index's domain.
Hence,
Let J(x) = cos 2 θ andẑ be any unit vector in the first orthant, so thatẑ ∈ R n + . Also, let the inner products ofẑ be1 Tẑ = cosα andx Tẑ = cosβ. Hence, z T Pẑ = cosα cosβ(1 − cosθ), z T Qẑ = (−cosα + 2cosθ cosβ)(cosα − cosθ cosβ), z T Rẑ = 2 − cos 2 β.
From the expression for the Hessian above, x ∈ R n + ⇒ ∇ 2 x J(x) 0. In other words, when x is in the non-negative orthant, the Hessian of the Jain's index is negative semi-definite. It can readily be inferred that in the non-negative orthant, R n + , the index has a global maximum, and that no other local maxima exist.
APPENDIX C
With the exception of the budget balance constraint (23f ) in (23a), which is straightforward to obtain, the expressions associated with all other constants involved in the remaining constraints in (23b) -(23e), are provided below.
(i) Voltage constraint (ii) Flow constraint
The vector c P 0 and the matrices C P p and C P q appearing in the above expressions are, C P p = A + TA + TJ L T P ,
In the above expression, the vectors C P 0 p and C P 0 q are given by the following pair of equations,
